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I once heard Abel Wolman tell a group of engineers that 
if they ever got a chance to build a dam, do it!  I now 
think better advice would be that, if there is ever an 
opportunity to privatize a public water function, do it!  I 
am a bit surprised at times to hear myself say this 
because I received my undergraduate education in 
natural resources management in an era when the 
NAWAPA plan for diverting the waters of the Yukon to 
the lower 48 states was presented by at least one natural 
resources textbook as a model of water resource 
planning.  By the time I arrived in Washington in the 
1960s NAWAPA was slowly being killed by its obscene 
economics as it should have been.  I believed that there 
was merit in the idea that government could be the 
vehicle for developing water resources.  This, of course, 
was the Progressive Vision, the Gospel of Efficiency, a 
viewpoint that had pervaded my education as a 
conservationist. 
 
As an economist I was prepared to accept the 
Progressive Vision with the caveat that the benefits of a 
project should exceed its costs.  And I was prepared to 
execute the benefit-cost analysis and, in time, to 
participate in improving the Water Resource Council's 
Principles and Standards.  It was a vision that let me feel 
at home in Washington in the 1960s but as my 
experience accumulated I began to realize that bureaus 
responsible for planning water resource developments at 
any level of government, while motivated by 
professional goals and standards, were ultimately 
interested in increasing their reach, or some would say, 
their budgets; and the last thing anyone involved wanted 
to hear was that the economics of a proposed project 
were unfavorable.  Something was seriously wrong with 
a gospel that trusted professionals, politicians and their 
clients with water resources and, with little restraint, the 
funds to develop them. 
 
The 1960s were a part of the period Marion Clawson 
has called the era of management on the public lands.  
In water resources it was the end of the big projects and 
basin-wide development schemes.  In no small part this 
was because, as Walter Langbein, hydrologist par 
excellence for many years with USGS has pointed out, 
the nation had run out of the most efficient dam sites.  
This meant that if there ever had been an economically 
efficient water resource development project, it had 
already been built, perhaps in the preceding century and 
probably with private money.   Notwithstanding, the 
federal government had developed the Colorado, the 
Columbia, the Tennessee, the Missouri, the Mississippi, 
and numerous smaller basins with questionable 
efficiency gains for the nation (but nice gains for local 
beneficiaries).   
 
Other circumstances have changed as well.  Consider 
the situation in 1907 when William Howard Taft could 
say with reference to the Grand Valley Project in 
Colorado that “there are a good many enterprises that 
involve the outlay of capital so large or require so much 
risk that it is better that, associated with private 
enterprise, the government help, too . . . .”  In fact, 
private enterprise had tried and failed to bring water to 
the Valley.  The government project ended up costing 
far more than was estimated because of the same 
engineering difficulties that had defeated the private 
efforts. 
 
Now consider whether a President could make such a 
claim today about water resource projects when there 
are many firms of a size that can and do take on large 
and risky projects, if there is a positive expected payout.  
As evidence, there are reports that Enron, a private firm, 
is approaching cities along the Rio Grande offering to 
manage regional water plans and provide water supplies 
without taking irrigated land out of production.  What 
Taft should have said, perhaps, and which would surely 
be echoed today, is that “there are a good many 
enterprises so bad that only government is willing to 
undertake them and there is almost no limit to the size 
of a private undertaking, properly conceived and 
financed.”  None of the classic rationale for public 
involvement in water holds much water any longer, if it 
ever did.   
 
As an efficiency advocate, I would prefer to see private 
firms take a much larger hand in dealing with our water 
resource problems.  The more I have seen of the bad 
economics in water resource undertakings at any level 
of government, the more firmly I have become 
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convinced of the importance of economic efficiency.  
Unless we insist on economically efficient projects, i.e., 
with benefits greater than costs, we waste funds.  The 
more an economy puts its funds into inefficient projects, 
the less national output grows until at some point 
national output will decline.  Autocratic and socialist 
governments typically engage in such “transactions of 
decline.” 
 
The idea behind privatization is that an organization 
whose bottom line is seeing that costs do not exceed 
revenues is driven to be efficient.  Compare this with 
the incentives found in an organization that lives with 
the promise of an ever increasing budget, if they can 
demonstrate the ability to spend their current budget.  
The Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Forest service are 
examples of organizations that live by the perverse 
incentives of ever increasing budgets. To the Forest 
Service the payoff has been from road building and 
timber sales whose costs exceed revenues.  The more 
roads they could build and the more timber they could 
sell, the more Congress rewarded them with increased 
budgets.  The Forest Service has not been constrained 
by a need to demonstrate that benefits exceed costs.  
(For more on the Forest Service check out 
<http://www.ti.org>) 
 
The Corps of Engineers is driven to expand the public 
works budget.  They have been constrained by the 
formality of demonstrating that the benefits of a 
proposed project are not exceeded by project costs.  The 
challenge to the Corps has been to work around the 
formal constraint. This they have done in a variety of 
ways, none more clearly demonstrated than the recent 
case of waterway improvements in the upper 
Mississippi in which the Corps managers have been 
shown blatantly to be manipulating the benefit-cost 
models to turn a veritable pig's ear into a silk purse.  
The bottom line for the Corps as stressed in internal 
memoranda was increasing the budget. (Read the 
affidavit by Donald Sweeney, a Corps economist, at 
<http://www.environmentaldefense.org>.) 
 
Municipal water departments would appear on the 
surface to be driven by efficiency because they depend 
on revenues from customers.  Beginning at least with 
Hirshleifer, deHaven, and Milliman (1960), study after 
study has exposed water departments to be models of 
inefficiency.  They have been shown to tolerate leaky 
distribution systems.  They refuse to meter water to 
customers.  They ignore the price elasticity of demand 
for water.  They blithely underprice water at the margin 
in the belief that expanding use will generate political 
support for expanding supplies.  Temporary and 
infrequent shortages imposed by drought, though 
economically justified, are unthinkable.  Flashy 
engineering monuments like dams and interbasin 
diversions are preferred to more cost effective 
alternatives like tightening up the efficiency of their 
systems and of users' behavior. 
 
Water departments have been able to get by with 
inefficiencies that the private market would not tolerate 
because they operate as public agencies or as public 
utilities with guarantees that revenues from all sources, 
including tax subsidies, will meet their costs.  The tax 
subsidies include direct subventions from the local tax 
base and the ability to float tax-free bonds.  The 
subsidies include assistance from the federal 
government in the form of “multiple purpose” reservoirs 
built by the federal water resource agencies that can 
spread some of the costs of water supply among other 
project purposes.  We can give credit to municipal 
beneficiaries for repaying their share of the costs with 
interest but we dare not look too closely at the rates of 
interest they are charged.  In contrast, flood control, 
recreation, and navigation beneficiaries don't directly 
repay costs and irrigation does not repay the interest 
costs.  And the rules for benefit-cost analysis do require 
that the value of the municipal water supplies 
contributed must exceed the federal costs (except in the 
case of communities under 10,000 population – no 
small loophole).  The federal benefit-cost rules also 
impose on the planners the requirement of showing that 
there are no more cost-effective solutions for increasing 
water supplies than building structures. 
 
For many years into my career I believed that systems 
analysis and economic rationality properly applied 
could correct the inefficiencies shown to exist in water 
supply practice.  Systems analysis and economic 
reasoning enabled us at Resources for the Future in the 
1960s to show that there were many superior 
alternatives to the Corps of Engineers plan for 16 major 
dams in the Potomac basin, if costs alone were the 
criterion and maintenance of dissolved oxygen in the 
estuary was the objective of planning (Davis, 1968).  
Later, Steve Hanke and I were able to show that given 
the ability to price water seasonally at its marginal costs, 
the multiplepurpose water storage projects were an 
unneeded solution for the Washington, D.C. water 
supply problems.  Daniel Sheer, an independent 
consultant and Bob McGarry, the head of the 
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission were able 
in the 1980s, together with the local water suppliers and 
some astute analysts, to put into place a water supply 
plan for the Washington, D.C. area that depended 
heavily on systems analysis, pricing, sensible risk 
management, and a minimum of additional water 
storage and emergency water treatment facilities. 
(McGarry, 1983). 
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The sad truth is that we in the public sector or any 
political bureaucracy resist innovative ideas that 
improve efficiency if those ideas represent a change in 
the way we think about problems, if they require 
changes in behavioral patterns of the 
institutions/agencies concerned, and if incentives for the 
managers don't change.  I think we have learned that the 
water users, because they face economic incentives in 
the form of payments for their water, are much more 
responsive to cost saving ideas than are the managers, 
because the managers operate with a set of incentives 
that have more to do with the size of their budgets and 
maintaining the status quo than with the efficiency of 
their performance.   
 
It should be indisputable that the solution adopted for 
Washington, D.C.'s water supply problems was one of 
those innovations that improve efficiency.  While I was 
teaching at the Ohio State University about ten years 
ago I gave an invited public lecture on municipal water 
supply management in which I extolled the virtues of 
efficient solutions in general and of the Washington, 
D.C. water supply plan in particular. At this time a local 
water department was going all out on a plan for more 
water storage to meet projected demands and stubbornly 
resisting suggestions for adjusting water rates to reflect 
marginal costs, for projecting demands with realistic 
sensitivity to prices, for drought emergency planning 
with water conservation measures.  The game was so 
serious that some prominent efficiency advocates 
received subtle threats.   
 
From the Ohio experience I went to a developing 
country where a water supply plan had to be evaluated.  
We found that the department in charge of the study 
wanted dams.  They had forbidden the consultants 
charged with the engineering studies to investigate the 
feasibility of pumping groundwater, which has since 
proven to be the superior alternative.  From that point 
on I became an advocate of changing the incentives for 
the water supply managers.  The more they can respond 
like the managers of General Electric and Intel to 
problems of demand and supply, the less we will hear 
about “water crises” and the more we will see 
appropriate, economically efficient responses to water 
supply problems.   
 
It might be objected that water utilities are natural 
monopolies that will gouge their customers if they 
operate as private companies.  I don't believe this.  Their 
customers will regulate them, if they get out of line.  
And besides, they will have a franchise from some level 
of government to keep them responsible.  I believe the 
greater risk is that a private company will be intimidated 
from charging its customers the long-run cost of water 
supplies at the margin simply because they wear a 
political leash.  This will be unfortunate because 
without marginal cost pricing, the true worth of water 
supply to the users cannot be known and overbuilding 
will be the consequence. 
 
I do not believe the future is black.  Our engineers and 
managers are competent, if perversely challenged.  
Municipal governments have learned to privatize 
functions through contracting and franchising.  There 
are private water companies with long records of 
efficient service.  A committee appointed by the 
National Research Council is currently studying the 
pros and cons of private municipal water services.  As 
long as a company like Enron sees opportunities to 
compete with the public agencies in solving water 
supply problems, there is hope.  It is necessary, 
however, for us to be willing to allow competition from 
new ideas and new entrants into the field of providing 
water services. 
 
 
Robert K. Davis, fresh out of Harvard with a Ph. D. in 
economics, entered the water field because RFF wanted 
a new gun to perform a systems analysis of the Corps of 
Engineers 1962 plan for developing the water resources 
of the Potomac River Basin.  There followed a career of 
analyzing many other plans for channelization, 
irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply as an 
employee of national and international organizations 
and the U.S. Department of Interior.  He has taught, 
written, and lectured on water resource economics.  
Currently he serves on a National Research Council 
committee charged with evaluating the state of 
ecosystem science for managing the Missouri River.  
For the past 10 years he has been affiliated with the 
Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado 
at Boulder. 
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